State v. Wheeler Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 35194 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-15-2009
State v. Wheeler Appellant's Brief Dckt. 35194
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Wheeler Appellant's Brief Dckt. 35194" (2009). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 926.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/926
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
1 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 35194 
) 
v. ) 
1 
SHAWN THOMAS WHEELER, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
1 
Defendant-Appellant. i 
-) 
I 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 1 I 
). S"prQmQ Couii--GDUrt of Rppezts-." 
! Enlered on RTS by: -- 
- _.----_-_ I 
-, 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
HONORABLE JOHN P. LUSTER 
District Judge 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
State Appellate Public Defender Deputy Attorney General 
State of Idaho Criminal Law Division 
1.S.B. # 4843 P.0. BOX 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010 
SARA B. THOMAS (208) 334-4534 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. # 5867 
DIANE M. WALKER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. # 5920 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ldaho 83703 
(208) 334-271 2 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ I 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... I 
................................................................... ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 16 
ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................ 17 
I. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Continuing To 
Allow The Police Officer To Submit False Testimony And 
Then Vouching For The Trooper's Credibility In Closing 
Arguments ............................................................................................ 17 
A. Introduction ......................................................................................... 17 
B. Mr. Wheeler Was Denied Due Process And A Fair Trial 
Because The Prosecutor Allowed The Police Officer To 
Submit False Testimony And Then Vouched For His 
Credibility In Closing Arguments ......................................................... 17 
.................. 1. The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct I 9  
2. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Fundamental 
Because The United States Supreme Court Has 
Determined That Presenting False Testimony Denies 
........................................................... A Defendant Of A Fair Trial 23 
3. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Not Harmless ......................... 25 
II. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wheeler's 
Motion To Suppress The Results Of The Forcible Blood 
Draw Because It Was Unreasonable Under The 
Circumstances And Mr. Wheeler Revoked His Implied 
............................................................................................ Consent 26 
A. Introduction ......................................................................................... 26 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wheeler's 
Motion To Suppress The Results Of The Forcible Blood 
Draw Because It Was Unreasonable Under The 
Circumstances And Mr. Wheeler Revoked His Implied 
.......................................................................................... Consent ..26 
1. Mr. Wheeler's Blood Test Results Should Have Been 
Suppressed Because The Forcible Blood Draw Was 
Unreasonable Under The Circumstances ...................................... 28 
C. Mr. Wheeler Revoked His lmplied Consent To Submit To 
An Evidentiary Test ........................................................................... 32 
D. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Allowing Trooper 
Jayne To Present False Testimony, Failed To Correct The 
False Testimony, And Thereafter Failed To Correct The District 
Court's Reliance On The False Testimony When Allowing The 
Admission Of The Forcible Blood Test Results ................................... 34 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 36 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 37 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
.................................................................. . Alcorta v Texas. 355 U.S. 28 (1957) 19 
........................................................ California v . Acevedo. 500 U.S. 565 (1991) 27 
Florida v . Jimeno, 500 U.S. 348 (1 991) .............................................................. 33 
......................................................... Giglio v . U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1 972) 18. 20. 23 
Greer v . Miller, 483 U.S . 756, 765 (1 987) ........................................................... 17 
In re Halen, - Idaho -, 41 P.3d 257 (2002) ................................................. 29 
Mooney v . Holohan. 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935) .............................................. 19 
Napue v . Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1 959) ......................................................... 20 
. . . . ............................................. People v . Kraft. 84 Cal Rptr 280 (Cal App 1970) 28 
............................. Schmerber v . California, 384 U.S. 757. 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1 966) 26 
Schneckloth v . Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 21 8 (1 974) ............................................... 27 
.......................... Schwartzmiller v . Winfers, 99 Idaho 18, 576 P.2d 1052 (1 978) 17 
............................. . . Sfate v . Bower. 135 Idaho 554, 21 P.3d 491 (Ct App 2001) 27 
............................. State v . Brown, 131 Idaho 61. 951 P.2d 1288 (Ct.App.1998) 24 
............................. State v . Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 163 P.3d 1175 (2007) 18 
............................................. State v . Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 869 P.2d 224 (1993) 27 
State v . Diaz. 144 Idaho 300. 160 P.3d 739 (2007) ............................................ 26 
Sfafe v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 71 P . 608 (1903) ........................................................ 19 
............................. . . State v . Kuhn, 139 Idaho 71 0, 85 P.3d 11 09 (Ct App 2003) 24 
........................ State v . Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 983 P.2d 233 (Ct.App.1999) 24 
............................ State v . Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 934 P.2d 34 (Ct . App . 1997) 27 
.......................................... State v . Porfer. 130 Idaho 772. 948 P.2d 127 (1 997) 24 
................................................... Sfafe v . Rodriguez. 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007) 34 
. . .......................... State v . Sailas. 129 Idaho 432. 925 P.2d 1131 (Ct App 1996) 27 
....................................... State v . Sheahan. 139 Idaho 267. 77 P.3d 956 (2003) 24 
State v . Turner, 94 Idaho 548. 494 P.2d f 46 (1972) ........................................... 33 
.............................. State v . Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989) 29. 33 
................................................... . U.S. v . Edwards, 154 F.3d 915 (9th Cir 1998) 24 
United States v . Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505 (lofh Cir . 2000) ......................... 34 
United States v . Lockett. 406 F.3d 907 (3@ Cir . 2005) ....................................... 33 
...................................... United States v . Marshall, 348 F.3d 281 (1 Cir . 2003) 34 
United States v . McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir . 1993) ................................... 34 
................................ . . Unifed Sfafes v Mc Weeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (gth Cir 2006) 33 
....................................... United States v . Sanders, 424 F.3d 768 (8th Cir . 2005) 33 
........................................................... Welsh v . Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1 984) 27 
......................... Wong Sun v . United States, 371 U.S. 471. 83 S.Ct. 407 (1 963) 27 
Constitutional Provisions 
............................................................................................ ID .CONST . art . 1. § I  3 17 
U.S. CONST .amend . V ........................................................................................ 17 
U.S. CONST .amend . XIV ..................................................................................... 17 
Statutes 
I.C. 3 18-8002 ..................................................................................................... 32 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State presented false testimony during the preliminary hearing, motion to 
suppress hearing, and during trial. The State, thereafter, vouched for the credibility of a 
law enforcement officer who presented false testimony during these hearings. 
Mr. Wheeler asserts he was denied a fair trial and, therefore the matter should be 
remanded for a new hearing. Additionally, the district court erred denying his motion to 
suppress the forcible blood draw. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A preliminary hearing was conducted ( R  pp.19-20) which resulted in 
Mr. Wheeler being held over to district court to answer the charge (R., p.21). The 
prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Wheeler by Information with the crime of felony 
driving under the influence. (R., pp.17-18.) 
Mr. Wheeler motioned to have the result of the forcible blood draw suppressed 
because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights to be from unreasonable 
search and seizures. (R., pp.40-43.) Mr. Wheeler cited the ISP Video in support of his 
motion. (R., pp.40-43.) After noting it had reviewed Mr. Wheeler's motion, the court 
conducted the suppression hearing. (R., pp.44-46.) The district court denied 
Mr. Wheeler's motion. (R., p.48.) 
At the pretrial conference scheduled for August 27, 2007, both parties instructed 
the court that they were ready for trial. (Tr.0812712007, p.5, Ls.1-4.) ' The State also 
informed the district court that it provided a witness list to defense counsel. 
(Tr.08/2712007, p.5, Ls.21-23.) Mr. Wheeler's case was scheduled for trial on August 
30, 2007. (R., p.58.) The day before trial, the State informed the court that two State 
witnesses were unavailable and, therefore, the State needed the court to continue 
Mr. Wheeler's trial. (R., p.58.) Not wanting to waive speedy trial, Mr. Wheeler agreed 
to move the trial, but continue to have it set within the confines of a timely trial. 
(R., p.58.) 
Approximately one month later, Mr. Wheeler provided a waiver of speedy trial. 
(R., pp.68-69.) Additionally the parties stipulated to vacate and continue the jury trial 
because defense counsel had a scheduling conflict. (R., p.70.) 
Five months after the original trial setting, the parties again appeared before the 
district court for a pretrial conference. (Tr.Vol. I, p.7, Ls.1-4.) The Friday before the trial 
the State provided notice to defense counsel that it had three additional witnesses; 
Officer McAuliffe, Paul Guthrie, and Richard Bowers. (Tr.Vol. I, p.8, Ls.12-15.) Only 
Mr. Bowers testified at the trial. (Tr.Vol. I, p.5, Ls.1-4.) The Thursday before trial, 
Trooper Jayne wrote out Mr. Bowers' statement about what had occurred and at the 
' There are a number of transcripts. The Triat Transcript is contained in two volumes. 
Volume I includes hearings and trial dates January 28 through January 31. Volume II 
begins at page 287 and ends at page 445 and contains the remaining trial and the 
sentencing hearing. Mr. Wheeler will refer to the trial transcript by volume number 
reflected on the first page of each transcript. The remaining transcripts will be referred 
to its hearing date. 
trial, spoke with him in the hallway before he testified. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.317, Ls.18-20, 
p.319, Ls.12-19, p.319, L.23-p.320, L.1.) 
Mr. Wheeler's home site was positioned in Mr. Stukzke's rock quarry. (Tr.Vol. 1, 
p.89, Ls.10-23; Tr.Vol. 2, p.289, Ls.22-25.) Mr. Wheeler had the owner's permission to 
reside on the property at Highway 200 at milepost 61. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.289, Ls.22-25.) 
Mr. Stutzke claimed that Mr. Wheeler was not an employee (Tr.Vol. 1, p.241, Ls.2-3), 
yet Mr. Wheeler was responsible for watching the place and keeping an eye on the 
quarry (Tr.Vol. 1, p.245, Ls.8-9). Mr. Wheeler owned his own equipment at the rock 
quarry (Tr.Vol. 1, p.245, Ls.16-18) and used his equipment to do some excavating for 
Mr. Stutke (Tr.Vol. 1, p.246, Ls.13-14). Mr. Stutzke compensated Mr. Wheeler for his 
work (Tr.Vol.1, p.246, Ls.10-I I ) .  Mr. Stutzke's rock quarry borders Overman's rock 
quarry on both sides. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.289, Ls.22-25. Tr. Vol.1, p.241, L.25-p.242, L.2.) 
Overman's manager, Tom Scott keeps the general public out of Overman's rock quarry. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.277, Ls.7, 23-24, p.278, Ls.3-4, p.278, Ls.5-11.) On April 18, 2007, 
Mr. Overman knew that Mr. Wheeler was on his property and was intoxicated. (Tr.Vol. 
I ,  p.229, Ls.21-25.) Mr. Wheeler admitted that he drove his bike on the old highway 
owned by Mr. Overman with Mr. Overman's permission. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.354, Ls.19-22, 
p.355, Ls.1-12, p.356, Ls.10-17.) 
Mr. Stutzke testified that he and Mr. Wheeler had a disagreement on the morning 
of April 18, 2007. (Tr.Vol.1, p.244, Ls.13-22.) Mr. Wheeler denied having any contact 
with Mr. Stutzke that day, but testified that he confronted Mr. Stutzke's brother that 
morning over a compensation dispute. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.328, Ls.17-24, p.329, Ls.21-25, 
p.331, Ls.10-I I .) In the afternoon, Mr. Stutzke contacted the police and expressed his 
desire to have Mr. Wheeler removed from his property for trespassing because he had 
become a nuisance during the weeks leading up to his April 18, 2007 police call. 
(Tr.Vol. 2, p.290, Ls.1-3, 11-12.) Mr. Stutzke claimed that Mr. Wheeler was a reckless 
driver (not a drunk driver) and wanted him removed from his own property (not the 
highway). (Tr.Vol. 1, p.248, Ls.19-22.) Mr. Stutzke wanted Mr. Wheeler evicted from 
the property for trespassing. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.249, Ls.4-7.) The state patrol informed 
Mr. Stutzke that it would not remove Mr. Wheeler for trespassing. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.249, 
Ls.11-12.) Mr. Stutzke claimed he was fed up, wanted Mr. Wheeler removed from his 
property, and requested Trooper Jayne to do whatever was necessary to have 
Mr. Wheeler removed off the property. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.249, Ls.12-25.) Mr. Stutzke 
claimed that he informed Trooper Jeff Jayne that Mr. Wheeler was riding his motorcycle 
on the highway, had been drinking, and he wanted him removed from the property. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.250, Ls.12-16.) 
Overman's employee, Joseph Griffin, witnessed Mr. Wheeler at Overman's rock 
quarry on April 18, 2007. (Tr.Voi. 1, p.262, Ls.18-22.) Mr. Griffin observed Mr. Wheeler 
drinking vodka during the majority of the day. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.262, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Griffin 
didn't recall witnessing any Overman's employee requesting that Mr. Wheeler leave the 
quarry. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.263, Ls.8-11.) Mr. Griffin witnessed Mr. Wheeler traveling by foot 
and motorcycle during the day. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.263, Ls.12-16.) Mr. Griffin did not witness 
Mr. Wheeler ride his motorcycle on the highway that day. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.263, Ls.17-19.) 
Mr. Griffin's testimony is consistent with Mr. Wheeler's own testimony at trial. (Tr.Vol. 2, 
p.333, L.9-p.334, L.18.) 
On April 18, 2007, Overman's employee, James Bristol, contacted dispatch 
because Mr. Wheeler was passed out on a pile of rocks in the quarry. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.216, 
L.l-p.217, L.2.) According to Mr. Stutzke, Mr. Bristol contacted him and asked if he 
could do something about Mr. Wheeler. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.252, Ls.5-8.) Mr. Bristol testified 
that due to his personal experience with a friend, he was concerned for Mr. Wheeler's 
safety. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.217, Ls.2-8.) Additionally, Mr. Bristol did not want his employer to 
be responsible for any of Mr. Wheeler's potential injuries. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.217, Ls.8-11.) 
Dispatch advised Trooper Jayne that a witness reportedly observed Mr. Wheeler 
driving his motorcycle up and down the highway while he was intoxicated. (Tr.Vol. 1, 
p.49, Ls.7-11, p.49, L.22-p.50, L.1.) Trooper Jayne requested Lieutenant Drake to 
contact medical to be on scene with their arrival. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.83, Ls.10-13.) Contrary 
to his testimony at trial, Trooper Jayne wrote in his police report that he drove with the 
ambulance to Mr. Wheeler's location. (Compare Tr.Vol. 2, p.291, Ls.2-5, with Tr.Vol. 1, 
p.83, Ls.10-13.) According to Mr. Bristol, he showed law enforcement officers 
Mr. Wheeler's location and discussed with them how the officers were going to proceed. 
(Tr.Vol. I ,  p.218, Ls.11-14.) 
Contrary to Mr. Bristol's testimony, Trooper Jayne testified that when he arrived 
on scene, Mr. Wheeler's motorcycle was parked (Tr. Voi. 1, p.218, Ls.11-14) and when 
he drove by, he observed feet and then witnessed Mr. Wheeler sit up as if someone 
would sit up out of a grave (Tr.Vol. 1, p.52, Ls.10-16). In the police report, Trooper 
Jayne did not describe Mr. Wheeler "as if someone would sit up out of a grave." 
(Compare Tr.Vol. 2, p.291, Ls.7-11, with Tr.Vol. I, p.52, Ls. 10-1 6.) 
2. 
Mr. Bristol testified that the ambulance arrived when he was speaking with 
Trooper Jayne. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.224, Ls.17-18.) Mr. Bristol expressed his concern about 
Mr. Wheeler's wellbeing to Trooper Jayne, who then discussed the situation with the 
ambulance driver. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.224, Ls.19-22.) After Trooper Jayne discussed the 
situation with the ambulance driver, the medical unit left the scene without checking on 
Mr. Wheeler. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.224, L.23-p.225, L.2) Trooper Jayne testified the second 
day, that because the ambulance viewed Mr. Wheeler conscious in the rock pit they 
decided their services were no longer needed. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.198, Ls.3-19.) 
After meeting with law enforcement, Mr. Bristol returned to Mr. Wheeler's location 
to make sure he was all right. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.218, L.22-p.219, L.2.) Mr. Bristol thought 
Mr. Wheeler needed to sleep. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.219, Ls.3-7.) Thereafter, Mr. Bristol went 
home without any further discussions with law enforcement. (Tr.Vol. I ,  p.219, Ls.8-11.) 
Trooper Jayne made the decision to sit and watch Mr. Wheeler in hopes that 
Mr. Wheeler would drive his motorcycle on the highway and, thereafter, Trooper Jayne 
would arrest Mr. Wheeler and the case would be resolved without the necessity of a 
trial. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.204, Ls.3-10. p.200, Ls.2-12, p.250, L.25-p.251, L.2.) 
After Mr. Bristol checked on Mr. Wheeler, Mr. Wheeler began the process of 
starting his motorcycle. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.338, Ls.17-20.) Mr. Wheeler's motorcycle had 
difficulty starting, especially after sitting. (Tr.Voi. 1, p.265, Ls.1-2.) Typically, 
Mr. Wheeler's bike needed pushed in order to start. (Tr.Vo1. 1, p.265, Ls.3-5.) 
Mr. Wheeler attempted to start his motorcycle by pushing it around then jumping on it 
and popping the clutch. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.340, Ls.17-24.) Mr. Wheeler testified that he never 
drove on the highway that day, but remained only on the private property of 
Mr. Stutzke's and Mr. Overman's. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.341, Ls.12-25.) Mr. Wheeler testified 
that once he pushed the bike across the highway, he ran beside it, and gained enough 
momentum to get it started. (Tr.Vo1. 2, p.342, Ls.14-18.) Mr. Wheeler admitted that he 
drove his bike on the old highway owned by Mr. Overman with Mr. Overman's 
permission. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.354, Ls.19-22, p.355, Ls.1-12, p.356, Ls.10-17.) Neither 
Mr. Griffin nor Tom Scott observed Mr. Wheeler on the highway on April 18, 2007. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.276, Ls.4-6, p.263, Ls.17-19.) 
Where Trooper Jayne's vehicle was parked his view to the highway was 
obstructed. (Tr.Vo1. 1, p.90, Ls.23-25.) Another police officer staged with Trooper 
Jayne heard what appeared to be a motorcycle. (Tr.Vo1. I ,  p.58, L.24-p.59, L.2.) After 
waiting approximately one-hour, Trooper Jayne claimed to have witnessed Mr. Wheeler 
move from his location. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.57, L.17-p.58, L.1.) Trooper Jayne testified that he 
stepped out onto the highway to try and look down the highway in an attempt to see 
something. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.59, Ls.3-7.) He claimed to have seen Mr. Wheeler finishing his 
turn out of the rock pit onto the highway and started to head west. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.59, Ls.5- 
7, p.59, L.14-p.15, L.I.) Trooper Jayne returned to his vehicle and proceeded to follow 
Mr. Wheeler. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.60, Ls.5-7, p.62, Ls.19-24.) Thirty seconds before Trooper 
Jayne's lights were activated, the trooper's video recorder automatically began 
recording. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.60, Ls.8-10, p.92, Ls.3-7.) 
Although Trooper Jayne testified that Mr. Wheeler was in front of him on the 
highway, Mr. Wheeler cannot be seen on the video riding his motorcycle until he is 
stopped by Trooper Jayne on the privately owned road. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.61, L.23-p.62, L.9; 
see also Exhibit ISP video.)' During cross-examination, Trooper Jayne admitted that 
there was a brief moment of time that he no longer had a visual over the motorcycle. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.91, Ls.7-9.) Trooper Jayne was also asked to explain the discrepancy in 
his probable cause affidavit and his trial testimony regarding "chasing" Mr. Wheeler. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.107, L.17, p.108, L.9.) In his written report, Trooper Jayne made it sound 
as if he was in hot pursuit of Mr. Wheeler down the highway, not that he was staged 
some distance away, heard the motorcycle, and allegedly viewed in the distance 
Mr. Wheeler driving. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.107, L.17, p.108, L.9.) Trooper Jayne attempted to 
explain that the probable cause affidavit is condensed and does not contain many of the 
detailed facts in an attempt to assist the court. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.108, Ls.13-22.) When trial 
counsel inquired if the accurate information was contained in his incident report, 
Trooper Jayne stated that he did not bring the report with him to court. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.108, 
Ls.23-25.) When trial counsel provided a copy of the incident report to Trooper Jayne, 
the officer admitted that he did not include the information that he was staged, heard the 
motorcycle's engine, which resulting in him running out into the road to observe the 
motorcycle. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.109, Ls.3, 13-17.) Trooper Jayne eventually admitted that his 
omissions of the details in his report would lead a third person reader to believe that he 
was traveling down the highway trying to catch up with Mr. Wheeler which is inaccurate. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.112, L.22-p.113, L.2.) 
When trying to get Mr. Wheeler location, Trooper Jayne testified that he was 
caught by traffic and was unable to get through. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.66, L.25-p.67, L.2.) 
Occasionally, video time is provided to give an estimation to where the evidence may 
be viewed on the video. The time reference is reflected of the time viewable on the 
bottom right corner of the recording. 
Recognizing this misrepresentation, the prosecutor asked Trooper Jayne, "these are 
vehicles actually parked on that old section of the highway; is that correct?" to which 
Trooper Jayne answered in the affirmative. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.67, Ls.4-6.) Trooper Jayne 
wrote in his report that he turned onto a side road and was blocked by two parked 
trailers. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.291, L.25-p.292, L.l, p.292, Ls.6-8.) Upon approaching Trooper 
Jayne, Mr. Wheeler stopped and, thereafter, was assisted off his motorcycle by Trooper 
Jayne and Lieutenant Jim Drake. (Tr.Vol. I ,  p.67, Ls.6-12, p.68, Ls.3-5, see also 
Exhibit ISP Video.) 
On cross-examination, contrary to his implied testimony on direct examination, 
Trooper Jayne admitted that he contacted Mr. Wheeler on the "old abandoned section 
of the highway." (Tr.Vol. 1, p.93, Ls.18-22.) Sam Overman owns the section of 
abandoned highway. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.230, Ls.3-5, p.277, Ls. 10-13.) Trooper Jayne 
assumed the vehicles belonged to Overman's because they own the north side of the 
road. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.96, L.21-p.97, L.3.) Overman's employee confirmed at the trial that 
Overman parked his trucks on the abandoned section of highway that he owns. (Tr.Vol. 
I ,  p.230, Ls.6-8.) 
Lieutenant Drake testified that he waited in the staging area with Trooper Jayne 
for quite sometime. (Tr.Vol, 1, p.234, L.5-8.) He admitted that he could not see the 
highway towards the west because of the build-up on the road, but he could see the 
highway in front of the driveway. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.234, L.19-p.235, L.I.) Lietenant Drake 
testified that he witnessed Mr. Wheeler driving on the highway. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.232, L.22- 
p.233, L.2, p.238, Ls.3.) Lieutenant Drake did not check on Mr. Wheeler's condition 
when he first arrived and never witnessed Mr. Wheeler until after the pursuit began. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.235, Ls.18-25.) 
Late disclosed witness Mr. Bowers claimed to have witnessed Trooper Jayne 
and Lieutenant Drake pursuing Mr. Wheeler. (Tr.Vol 1, p.172, Ls.5-18.) Mr. Bowers 
claimed that Trooper Jayne had left the staging area first and was in pursuit of a 
motorcycle while Lieutenant Drake remained in the staging area. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.172, 
Ls.9-15.) While Mr. Bowers passed Lieutenant Drake, the sheriff vehicle pulled out with 
his lights on and passed Mr. Bowers. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.172, Ls.14-18.) Mr. Bowers claimed 
to have witnessed the motorcycle proceeding westbound in the westbound lane of 
Highway 200. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.173, Ls.12-15.) Additionally, he professed to have 
witnessed the motorcycle turn into the more westerly of the two entrances to what is 
labeled as the old highway. (Tr.Vol. I ,  p.174, Ls.3-6.) When Trooper Jayne stopped 
Mr. Wheeler, Mr. Bower drove by on the actual highway. (Tr. Vol. I ,  p.174, L.23-p.175, 
L.3, see also State's Exhibit Number 1, ISP Video.) Although Mr. Bowers claimed to 
have viewed Mr. Wheeler on the motorcycle the same as Trooper Jayne, he denied 
observing the flailing arms or Mr. Wheeler nearly tipping the motorcycle over. 
(Compare Tr.Vol 1, p.182, Ls.6-12 wifh Tr.Vol. 1, p.191, Ls.18-25.) 
During the detention and investigation, Mr. Wheeler showed obvious signs of 
intoxication. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.69, L.12-p.71, L.23.) At trial, Trooper Jayne testified that 
Mr. Wheeler did not respond initially to the request for breath testing. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.71, 
L.24-p.72, L.2.) When asked if Mr. Wheeler ever indicated if he would submit to a 
breath test, Trooper Jayne testified that he indicated by not responding and changing 
the subject and talking about other things. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.72, Ls.3-8.) 
Trooper Jayne testified that after he gave Mr. Wheeler the advisory 
requirements, he asked, Mr. Wheeler to provide a breath sample. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.202, 
L.20-p.203, L.7.) Trial counsel asked Trooper Jayne a second time if he asked 
Mr. Wheeler to provide a breath sample after he read Mr. Wheeler his advisory rights. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.203, Ls.8-10.) Trooper Jayne again stated that he tried to get Mr. Wheeler 
"to cooperate and do standardized sobriety evaluations" after reading the advisory 
rights. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.203, Ls.11-14.) Trooper Jayne testified at a previous hearing that 
Mr. Wheeler refused to submit to a breath sample. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.306, Ls.22-23.) 
Trooper Jayne testified under oath that there was no question that Mr. Wheeler was not 
going to submit to a breath test. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.307, Ls.13-15.) Trooper Jayne testified 
that he had no choice except to have Mr. Wheeler's blood drawn. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.307, 
Ls.21-24.) 
Trooper Jayne read his previous preliminary hearing transcript from May 2, 2007. 
(Tr.Vol. 2, p.295, Ls.17-18.) At that hearing, Trooper Jayne testified that he held up the 
Alco-Sensor Ill to Mr. Wheeler and Mr. Wheeler turned away and looked away. (Tr.Vol. 
2, p.297, Ls.23-25.) Trooper Jayne testified that he felt he could force a blood draw 
because Mr. Wheeler refused the breath test and because of the implied consent law. 
(Tr.Vol. 2, p.312, Ls.7-11.) 
Trooper Jayne made the decision to have the ambulance return to the scene for 
a forcible blood draw. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.72, Ls.18-24.) Trooper Jayne also made the 
decision to perform the forcible blood draw in the back of the patrol car. (Tr.Vol.1, p.73, 
Ls.2-2.) Trooper Jayne indicated that the ambulance driver was a phlebotomist. 
(Tr.Voi. 2, p.304, Ls.6-7.) Trooper Jayne removed Mr. Wheeler's handcuffs so they 
could have access to his arms. (Tr.Vol. I ,  p.73, Ls.3-4; Video 18:53:55.) Trooper 
Jayne had Mr. Wheeler remove his coat. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.4-6; Video 18:54:20.) 
Trooper Jayne held Mr. Wheeler's right arm from the passenger's side of the patrol 
vehicle, while Lieutenant Drake held his left arm down from the driver's side of the car. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.6-9.) Ambulance personnel conducted the forcible blood draw. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.10-12.) Mr. Wheeler told the officers and the ambulance driver they 
did not have his permission to withdraw his blood; they did not have his consent. 
(Tr.Vol. 2, p.304, Ls.15-16, Video 18:55:18-18:55:42.) Mr. Wheeler told everyone to 
not draw his blood. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55: 18-1 8:55:42.) Mr. Wheeler would flex his 
hand in an attempt to prevent the blood draw. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.310, Ls.10-I I.) This made 
it difficult for the ambulance driver to hit Mr. Wheeler's vein. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.310, Ls.11- 
12.) Trooper Jayne did not report a refusal for a license suspension. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.304, 
Ls.20-22.) Mr. Wheeler admitted that he was intoxicated. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.344, L.1.) He 
recognized that his blood alcohol level was .31 and explained that because he is an 
alcoholic and he has a high tolerance level. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.344, Ls.2-7.) 
While Mr. Wheeler's leaking blood was being cleaned up, Mr. Wheeler asked 
Trooper Jayne what he did. (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06.) Trooper Jayne responded, 
"You were driving." (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06.) Mr. Wheeler then asked, "On top of 
mountains right?" (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06.) When Trooper Jayne stated, "No out 
here on the highway, right?" Mr. Wheeler asked if Trooper Jayne was sure. (Exhibit, 
ISP Video 19:06.) Trooper Jayne said "No. Almost sure." (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06.) 
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the minor discrepancies in 
the officer's testimony should be ignored. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.401, Ls.22-24.) The prosecutor 
vouched for the officer by arguing, 
There's nothing wrong with Officer Jayne's investigation because there's 
some minor inconsistency between something that was said in three 
different places. Did you hear anything that struck you as being, the 
officer is lying? I mean, everything that the officer said has been 
corroborated by the evidence that's been offered to you by the defense. 
So think about that. Is he going to risk his career to make this case? 
During the trial, Mr. Wheeler apparently was speaking when his attorney was 
inquiring of Trooper Jayne. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.105, Ls.5-7.) When Mr. Wheeler didn't seem to 
understand, the court again informed him that he was prohibited from talking when the 
lawyers were asking questions. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.105, Ls.8-10.) Mr. Wheeler replied with an 
affirmative response. (Tr.Vo1. 1, p.105, L.ll.) After one additional question, the district 
court excused the jury. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.105, Ls.17-24.) The district court informed 
Mr. Wheeler that he had been cautioned about talking in front of the jury, and he was in 
contempt of court. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.106, Ls.7-9.) The district court informed Mr. Wheeler 
that it would impose its penalty upon him at the end of the day. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.106, Ls.7- 
9.) 
After the jury was released for the day, the court proceeded to handle the penalty 
for Mr. Wheeler's contempt. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.124, L.13-p.126, L.20.) The court stated the 
following: 
[EJvery defendant has the right to communicate with his client, but this 
defendant is doing so in a manner that is disrupting the progress of the 
trial, impeding - I don't want to - it appears to me that it's impeding the 
progress of the trial because defense counsel can't concentrate on the 
business at hand because of what has amounted to literally pestering by 
the defendant. There has got to be a better way to do this. I have seen 
trials over 20 years, and people can communicate without this kind of 
difficulty. 
Now, that's just kind of not so much - I'm not determining the 
defendant to be in any way contemptuous by that at this point. However, 
it's a warning that he can't communicate his case by his antics, his 
verbiage, his body English [sic], and so this has got to be, I think, a subject 
- I would recommend it be a subject of discussion. 
Trial counsel informed the court that he will speak with his client about the 
situation. (Tr.Vol.1, p.125, Ls.7-8.) Then the court went on to discuss a second 
contempt, 
Now I've held the defendant in contempt. After I did that, and the jury 
returned and we were in the process of playing the tape at the request of 
counsel, the defendant didn't say any words, but he did some body 
English [sic], combined with an unintelligible grunt, which was an obvious 
display of frustration with how things were transpiring, in full view of the 
jury. And that is the kind of conduct that is not permissible. 
If the defendant wants to communicate with this jury, he can waive 
his right to remain silent and give testimony at a time appropriate. Now, I 
think that this gesture without words is something that can't be caught on 
- it might be on the audio. I don't know. It's difficult or almost impossible 
in that situation, other than my verbal description. That's why I tried to get 
a detailed description of what I saw. It's contemptuous. 
I'm going to take under the advisement the penalty for the second 
one I'm regarding as a second contempt, and the defendant is going to be 
held overnight in the jail as a penalty for the first contempt that I imposed 
here previously. 
(Tr.Vol. 1, p.125, L.9-p.126, L.14.) Thereafter, the court warned Mr. Wheeler that if he 
displayed any further conduct in the presence of the jury, he would be in contempt again 
without any hearing on the matter. (Tr.Vol. I, p.126, Ls.8-14.) 
At the noon recess on the second day, the district court continued to keep the 
second contempt under advisement, but decided not to continue Mr. Wheeler's 
incarceration over the noon recess. (Tr.Vol. I ,  p.221, Ls.2-10.) The court did not enter 
a written order after finding Mr. Wheeler in contempt. (See Register of Actions.) 
After a three day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict finding that Mr. Wheeler 
committed the offense of driving under the influence. (Tr.Vol. II, p.411, Ls.11-13; 
R., p.110.) Mr. Wheeler stipulated that if he were found guilty of the DUI, he would 
likewise be guilty of the driving without a license offense.. (Tr.Vol. I, p.78, L.24-p.79, 
L. l l . )  Additionally, Mr. Wheeler waived a jury trial on Part II of the Information elevating 
the DUI to a felony, based on two prior convictions in a two year period. (Tr.Vol. 2, 
p.412, L.9-p.415, L.13.) 
The district court imposed upon Mr. Wheeler a unified ten year sentence, with 
four years fixed, but suspended execution of the sentence and sent Mr. Wheeler on a 
rider. (Tr.Vol.2, p.444, Ls.2-8; R., pp.117-120.) Mr. Wheeler timely appealed. 
(R., pp.121, 126-130.) On August 25, 2008, the district court suspended execution of 
Mr. Wheeler's sentence and placed him on probation. (See Register of Actions.) 
ISSUES 
1. Did the prosecutor commit prosecutorial misconduct by continuing to allow the 
police officer to submit false testimony and then vouching for the trooper's 
credibility in closing arguments? 
2. Did the district court err in denying Mr. Wheeler's motion to suppress the results 
of the forcible blood draw because it was unreasonable under the circumstances 
and Mr. Wheeler revoked his implied consent? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct BV Continuing To Allow The Police Officer To 
Submit False Testimony And Then Vouching For The Trooper's Credibility In Closinq 
Arauments 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Wheeler submits that the prosecutor committed misconduct when he allowed 
Trooper Jayne to testify falsely without correction. The prosecutor committed further 
misconduct by vouching for the officer's credibility in closing arguments. Mr. Wheeler 
submits that he was denied a fair trial as a result of the misconduct 
6. Mr. Wheeler Was Denied Due Process And A Fair Trial Because The Prosecutor 
Allowed The Police Officer To Submit False Testimonv And Then Vouched For 
His Credibilitv In Closina Arquments 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[nlo person 
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, "[n]o state shall . . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the ldaho Constitution also guarantees that, "[nlo 
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." ID. 
CONST. art. 1, §13. Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. 
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 ldaho 18, 19, 576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Prosecutorial 
misconduct may result in the denial of a fair trial. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 
(1987). 
In State v. Field, this Court articulated the standard by which the appellate courts 
review prosecutorial misconduct claims. 144 ldaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 285 (2007). 
First the prosecutor's actions will be reviewed to determine whether it constitutes 
misconduct. Id. When the defense objects, the prosecutorial misconduct will be 
reviewed for harmless error. Id. When the defense fails to object, prosecutorial 
misconduct will first be reviewed for fundamental error, and then if fundamental, the 
misconduct will be reviewed for harmlessness. Id. The United States Supreme Court 
has deemed this error "false testimony" to be fundamental and to be evaluated by 
whether the false testimony could in any reasonable likelihood have affected the 
judgment of the jury. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 
360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959)). 
Recently our ldaho Supreme Court stated: 
"Every person accused of crime in ldaho has the right to a fair and 
impartial trial," State v. Sharp, 101 ldaho 498, 504, 616 P.2d 1034, 1040 
(1980), "whether guilty or innocent," State v. Fowler, 13 ldaho 317, 89 P. 
757 (1907). We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that 
a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is 
submitted to the jury." State v. Irwin, 9 ldaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 
(1903). They should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they 
can trespass upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they 
transgress upon the rights of the accused." Id. Prosecutorial misconduct 
includes asking questions where the answer is inadmissible, but the jury 
can infer what the answer would have been simply from the questioned 
asked. Id. 
State v. Christiansen, 144 ldaho 463, 469, 163 P.3d 1175, 1181 (2007), 
"Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of the machinery of the court, 
and that they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give more 
credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of the trial and in the 
presence of the jury than they will give to counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 
Idaho 35, -, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903). The prosecutor's duty is to see that the 
defendant has a fair trial by presenting only competent evidence and avoid presenting 
evidence to prejudice the minds of the jury. Id. The prosecutor must refrain from 
deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate inferences. Id. 
The prosecutor in this case committed misconduct by knowingly allowing the 
investigating officer to testify falsely without making any attempts to correct the false 
testimony and then by vouching for the officer in the closing arguments. The State's 
actions in this case denied Mr. Wheeler a fair trial. The prejudice arising from the State 
could not have been remedied by an instruction from the trial court and, therefore, the 
misconduct was fundamental. Moreover, the State's behavior was not harmless 
-I. The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial Misconduct 
A prosecutor's deliberate use of perjured testimony to obtain a conviction violates 
due process and denies the defendant a fair trial. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 
112-13 (1935). "[Dleliberate deception of court and jury by presentation of testimony 
known to be perjured is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of justice." Id, This 
principle has also been applied to include not only a prosecutor's active solicitation of 
false testimony, but his failure to correct the false testimony. Alcorfa v. Texas, 355 U.S. 
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including 
false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit in any concept of 
ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely because the false 
testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. The jury's estimate of 
the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be 
determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as 
the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's 
life or liberty may depend. 
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). The Supreme Court quoted favorably from 
a New York Court of Appeals case providing that: 
'It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the witness' 
credibility rather than directly upon defendant's guilt. A lie is a lie, no 
matter what its subject, and if it is any way relevant to the case, the district 
attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be 
false and elicit the truth. . . .' 
Id. at 269-270 (quoting People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d 554, 557, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887, 
136 N.E.2d 853, 854-55). The United States Supreme Court has extended the 
prosecutor's responsibilities to not only correct what he actual knows to be false, but 
also to correct what he should have known. Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 
In this case, the prosecutor's misconduct begins at the preliminary hearing to 
have Mr. Wheeler bound over to answer charges, then continues to the suppression 
hearing in order to obtain the admission of the forcible blood test results, and then after 
receiving the favorable ruling from the suppression hearing the misconduct continues to 
obtain a conviction during the trial. 
At the preliminary hearing, Trooper Jayne testified that he asked Mr. Wheeler to 
submit to a breath test. (Tr.05/02/2007, p.6, L.25-p.7, L.2.) Trooper Jayne then states 
that he tried to hold up the Alco-Sensor Ill and Mr. Wheeler would turn away and look 
away. (Tr.05/02/2007, p.7, Ls.4-7.) Trooper Jayne statement is completely false. 
(Exhibit, ISP Video.) After describing Trooper Jayne's version of Mr. Wheeler's driving, 
he claimed that Mr. Wheeler's driving "should show pretty good on my video." 
(Tr.05/02/2007, p.14, Ls.1-2.) The only driving that is visible on the video is 
Mr. Wheeler being on Mr. Overman's private property. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) Trooper 
Jayne admitted that he had not yet watched the video. (Tr.05/02/2007, p.14, L.4.) The 
State was in the possession of Trooper Jayne's video that recorded Mr. Wheeler's stop 
and forcible blood draw. Thus, even if the prosecutor did not personal know of the false 
statements, he should have been aware. 
At the suppression hearing, the State continues to allow Trooper Jayne to 
present false testimony, without any attempt of correcting the statements. Trooper 
Jayne testified, "I read Mr. Wheeler the Idaho 18-8002 advisory form advising him of the 
requirements to provide evidentiary testing and the results or the consequences if he 
did not. Then asked him to provide a breath sample, he would not do that." 
(Tr.07/25/07, p.1 I, Ls.12-16.) Trooper Jayne never offered Mr. Wheeler the opportunity 
to give a breath sample after reading him his advisory rights. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) "I 
told him that if he would not provide a breath sample that I was going to have his blood 
drawn, so he had a choice of doing that or having his blood drawn." (Tr.07125107, p.12, 
Ls.9-11.) The video demonstrates that Trooper Jayne never offered Mr. Wheeler a 
choice between which tests that he would submit to. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) Trooper 
Jayne then stated, "So again I reiterated that he gives the breath sample, we wouldn't 
have to do that, and he continued to refuse." (Tr.07125107, p.12, Ls.15-17.) This 
testimony is false. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) Mr. Wheeler was not offered a choice between 
tests. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) Trooper Jayne also testified that "there was no question 
that he wasn't going to provide a breath sample." (Tr.07125/07, p.12, Ls.3-4.) Again, 
this is contrary to the video. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) 
At trial, Trooper Jayne again presented false testimony surrounding the forcible 
blood draw and Mr. Wheeler's alleged refusals to submit to a breath test. Trooper 
Jayne testified that after he gave Mr. Wheeler the advisory requirements, he asked 
Mr. Wheeler to provide a breath sample. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.202, L.20-p.203, L.7.) Trial 
counsel asked Trooper Jayne a second time if he asked Mr. Wheeler to provide a 
breath sample after he read Mr. Wheeler his advisory rights. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.203, Ls.8-10.) 
Trooper Jayne again stated that he tried to get Mr. Wheeler "to cooperate and do 
standardized sobriety evaluations" after reading the advisory rights. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.203, 
Ls.11-14.) Mr. Wheeler's attorney had Trooper Jayne read his prior testimony regarding 
the breath test requests. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.306, Ls.22-23, Tr.Vo1. 2, p.295, Ls.17-18, Tr.Vol. 
2, p.297, Ls.23-25.) Trooper Jayne testified under oath that there was no question that 
Mr. Wheeler was not going to submit to a breath test. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.307, Ls.13-15.) 
Trooper Jayne testified that he had no choice except to have Mr. Wheeler's blood 
drawn. (Tr.Voi. 2, p.307, Ls.21-24, Tr.Vo1. 2, p.312, Ls.7-11.) 
Trooper Jayne never attempted to correct his prior false testimony or explain to 
the jury his current false testimony. More egregious is that the prosecutor did nothing 
about the false testimony, except attempt to vouch for the officer's credibility. During 
closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the minor discrepancies in the officer's 
testimony should be ignored. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.401, Ls.22-24.) The prosecutor vouched for 
the officer by arguing: 
There's nothing wrong with Officer Jayne's investigation because there's 
some minor inconsistency between something that was said in three 
different places. Did you hear anything that struck you as being, the 
officer is lying? I mean, everything that the officer said has been 
corroborated by the evidence that's been offered to you by the defense. 
So think about that. Is he going to risk his career to make this case? 
The prosecutor committed misconduct. Not only did he use false testimony to 
get Mr. Wheeler held over to answer the charges, he continued to use the false 
testimony to have Mr. Wheeler's motion to suppress denied and then used the false 
testimony to have Mr. Wheeler convicted. Then in closing he vouches for the officer. 
This Court should find that the prosecutor committed misconduct. 
2. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Fundamental Because The United 
States Supreme Court Has Determined That Presenting False Testimony 
Denies A Defendant Of A Fair Trial 
Mr. Wheeler contends that all of the misconduct not objected to constituted 
fundamental error. Mr. Wheeler contends that the United States Supreme Court has 
held that where the prosecutor uses false testimony during trial, it denies a defendant a 
fair trial and, therefore, "[a] new trial is required 'if the false testimony could . . . in any 
reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury."' Giglio v. U.S., 405 U.S. 
150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271). Mr. Wheeler submits that Idaho's 
evaluation of whether the error is fundamental is not necessary when the prosecutorial 
misconduct claim is that the State used false testimony. The right to have a jury 
determine the credibility of each witness, free from impermissible vouching in a case 
where the credibility of the victims is crucial, is fundamental. Nevertheless, even under 
Idaho's analysis of fundamental error, he asserts that prejudice from the prosecutor's 
misconduct could not have been remedied from the trial court instructing the jury to 
disregard the comments and, therefore, the errors are fundamental. 
An error is considered fundamental where the comments were so egregious or 
inflammatory that any prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial 
court instructing the jury to disregard the comments. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 
280, 77 P.3d 956, 939 (2003). The ldaho Court of Appeals has held: 
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error when it is 
calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse prejudice or passion 
against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be 
influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the evidence. 
State v. Kuhn, 139 ldaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 11 14 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing State v. 
Porter, 130 ldaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997)); State v. Lovelass, 133 ldaho 
160, 167, 983 P.2d 233, 240 (Ct. App. 1999)). Furthermore, "[tlhe rationale of this rule 
is that even a timely objection to such inflammatory statements would not have cured 
the inherent prejudice." Id. (citing State v. Brown, 131 ldaho 61, 69, 951 P.2d 1288, 
1296 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
It is well settled that a prosecutor in a criminal case "has a special 
obligation to avoid 'improper suggestions, insinuations, and especially 
assertions of personal knowledge."' United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 
530, 533 (9th Cir.1980) (quoting Berger v. Unifed States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 
55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.M. 1314 (1935)). A prosecutor may not impart to the 
jury his belief that a government witness is credible. United States v. 
McKoy, 771 F.2d 1207, 1210-1 1 (9th Cir.1985). Such improper vouching 
may occur in at least two ways. The prosecutor may either "place the 
prestige of the government behind the witness or . . . indicate that 
information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony." 
Roberts, 618 F.2d at 533. When the credibility of witnesses is crucial, 
improper vouching is particularly likely to jeopardize the fundamental 
fairness of the trial. United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445 (9th 
Cir. 1991). 
U.S. v. Edwards, 154 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 1998). 
In this case, a jury instruction would not have cured the misconduct. The 
prosecutor committed misconduct from the beginning of the case to the end. The 
prosecutor used the false testimony to avoid the suppression of the blood test results. 
He used the blood test results to discredit Mr. Wheeler's testimony and bolster the 
Trooper's testimony. Moreover, he vouched for the credibility of the Trooper at closing. 
The misconduct in this case was fundamental and denied Mr. Wheeler a fair trial. 
3. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Was Not Harmless 
Mr. Wheeler submits that the prosecutorial misconduct in this case was not 
harmless. He asserts that the false testimony could have reasonably affected the 
judgment of the jury. 
Mr. Wheeler submits that this case boiled down to the credibility of Mr. Wheeler 
and his assertion that he never drove on the highway when he was intoxicated on 
April 18, 2007. He submits that due to the prosecutorial misconduct in allowing, not 
correcting, and even vouching for the officer could have reasonably likely affected the 
judgment of the jury. The prosecutor successfully defeated Mr. Wheeler's motion to 
suppress the blood test results with the use of false testimony. Then, by using the 
results of the blood test, attempted to discredit Mr. Wheeler's credibility. 
The officer claimed that Mr. Wheeler's driving on the highway would have been 
seen fairly clearly on the video. Then, when the video obviously did not reveal 
Mr. Wheeler driving on the highway, Trooper Jayne developed an elaborated excuse of 
why it would not show Mr. Wheeler. Additionally, in the video, when inquiring of 
Mr. Wheeler about his driving location, Mr. Wheeler never admits to driving on the 
public highway. When Mr. Wheeler poses questions back towards Trooper Jayne if he 
was sure about him driving on the public highway, Trooper Jayne says, "No. Almost 
sure." Mr. Wheeler submits that he never drove on the public highway. He contends 
that Trooper Jayne wasn't sure either. Mr. Wheeler submits that the credibility of 
Trooper Jayne was critical and this misconduct that occurred in this case was not 
harmless. 
II. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wheeler's Motion To Suppress The Results 
Of The Forcible Blood Draw Because It Was Unreasonable Under The Circumstances 
And Mr. Wheeler Revoked His Implied Consent 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Wheeler respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
motion to suppress order for three reasons. First, the forcible blood draw was 
unreasonable under the circumstances of this case. Second, Mr. Wheeler revoked his 
implied consent. Third, the prosecutor committed misconduct in allowing Trooper Jayne 
to present false testimony, fails to correct the false testimony, and thereafter fails to 
correct the court's reliance on the false testimony when making its decision to allow the 
results of the forcible blood test to be admitted. 
B. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Wheeler's Motion To Suppress The 
Results Of The Forcible Blood Draw Because It Was Unreasonable Under The 
Circumstances And Mr. Wheeler Revoked His Implied Consent 
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I section 13 of the 
ldaho Constitution require that all searches and seizures be reasonable. The 
administration of a blood alcohol test constitutes a seizure of a person and a search for 
evidence under both the federal and state constitutions. Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct 1826 (1966); State v. Diaz, 144 ldaho 300, 303, 160 P.3d 739, 742 
(2007). Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall 
within a specifically established and well-delineated exception to the warrant 
requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Murphy, 129 
ldaho 861,863,934 P.2d 34,36 (Ct. App. 1997). 
When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, the State bears a heavy 
burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. State v. Bower, 135 ldaho 
554, 21 P.3d 491 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750 
(1984); Sfafe v. Curl, 125 ldaho 224, 225, 869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993); State v. Sailas, 
129 ldaho 432, 434, 925 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Ct. App. 1996)). If evidence is not seized 
pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence discovered 
as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
Even when the warrantless search falls within a well-recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement, the search and seizure must still be reasonable in light of all of the 
surrounding circumstances. Diaz, 144 ldaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 741. One exception to 
the warrant is a search done pursuant to the owner's voluntary consent. Schnecklofh v. 
Busfamonfe, 412 U.S. 218, 219, (1974). Mr. Wheeler does not dispute that pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-8002, "in ldaho 'any person who drives or is in actual physical control' of a 
vehicle impliedly consents to evidentiary testing for alcohol at the request of a peace 
officer with reasonable grounds for suspicion of DUI." Mr. Wheeler, however, submits 
that the blood test results should be suppressed for two reasons. First, the blood draw 
was not reasonable under the circumstances. Second, Mr. Wheeler revoked his implied 
consent prior to the blood draw. 
1. Mr. Wheeler's Blood Test Results Should Have Been Su~pressed 
Because The Forcible Blood Draw Was Unreasonable Under The 
Circumstances 
In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court rejected the defendant's Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding the peaceful withdrawal of his blood in a 
driving under the influence case, stating that: 
We thus conclude that the present record shows no violation of petitioner's 
right under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free of 
unreasonable searches and seizures. It bears repeating, however, that we 
reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of 
an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. That we today 
hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into 
an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way 
indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under 
other conditions. 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772. The Supreme Court specifically stated that “[lit would be a 
different case if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a reasonable request 
to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to resistance with inappropriate 
force." Id. at 760 n.4. The Supreme Court also specifically incorporated this Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis into its discussion of the reasonableness requirement under its 
Fourth Amendment analysis. Id. 
In People v. Kraft, 84 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. App. 1970), the California Court of 
Appeals, relying upon Schmerber, suppressed evidence of blood alcohol content from 
testing of blood drawn where the defendant resisted, two officers grabbed his arms, 
forced him to the floor, immobilized him, applied force to hold his arm still so that a 
doctor could withdraw blood from his arm. Id. at 283. The Court held that the amount 
of force used violated the warnings given in Schmerber and suppressed the evidence. 
Id. at 285, 
In Sfafe v. Woolery, I16 ldaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989), the ldaho Supreme 
Court addressed I.C. 3 18-8002(3)(a-d), containing statutory license suspension 
penalties of which a person must be informed when arrested for driving under the 
influence. Id. at 371, 775 P.2d at 1213. Although the Supreme Court held that the 
failure to inform the defendant of the statutory license suspension under the statute did 
not result in suppression of the results of consensual blood draw in that case, the 
Supreme Court held that "the purpose of warning of license suspension following a 
refusal is to overcome an unsanctioned refusal by threat instead of force," "to 
nonforcibly enforce the driver's previous implied consent" and "to avoid the violence 
which would often attend forcible test upon recalcitrant inebriates." Id. at 372-73, 775 
P.2d at 1214-15. 
In re Halen, 136 ldaho 829, 834, 41 P.3d 257, 262 (2002), the ldaho Supreme 
Court held that "I.C. $$ 18-8002(6)(b) grants an officer limited authority to order medical 
personnel to physically administer a blood withdrawal." Id. at 834, 41 P.3d at 262. 
Moreover, I.C. 3 18-8002(6)(e)(i) grants medical personnel the right to delay or 
terminate withdrawal of a blood sample if "[lln the reasonable judgment of the hospital 
personnel withdrawal of the blood sample may result in serious bodily injury to hospital 
personnel." 
In this case, Mr. Wheeler's forcible blood draw was unreasonable. The officers 
used unreasonable force before, during, and after the blood draw. Trooper Jayne lied 
about attempting to first obtain a breath sample from Mr. Wheeler. Trooper Jayne 
misrepresented the facts about Mr. Wheeler's refusal to take a breath sample. He 
immediately made the decision to conduct a forcible blood draw.3 Suppressing the 
blood test results in this case will encourage officers to use forcible blood draws when 
necessary and not simply as a matter of course. 
Before placing Mr. Wheeler under arrest, Trooper Jayne is heard on the video 
stating that he is requesting the medical group for a blood draw. (See Exhibit ISP Video 
18:30.44 and 18:31:18; Tr.Vol. 1, p.72, Ls.18-24.) After placing Mr. Wheeler under 
arrest and before placing him in the patrol car, Trooper Jayne asked Mr. Wheeler if he 
was going to give him a breath sample. (See Exhibit ISP Video 18:31:36.) This 
superficial request for a breath sample was made after the request for medical was 
made to return to the area for the forcible blood draw. (See Exhibit ISP Video 18:30- 
18:32.) Trooper Jayne stated that he had a portable breath machine, yet contrary to 
Trooper Jayne's testimony he is not seen on the video attempting to have Mr. Wheeler 
blow into the machine. (See Exhibit ISP Video.) 
After making his superficial request for Mr. Wheeler to submit to a breath test, 
Trooper Jayne can be heard telling dispatch that he is waiting for medical for a blood 
draw. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:33:54.) Trooper Jayne's comments were prior to reading 
Mr. Wheeler the implied consent warning. (See Exhibit ISP Video.) 
Trooper Jayne also made the decision to have medical perform the forcible blood 
draw in the back of the patrol car, instead of transporting him to a local hospital. 
(Tr.Vol.1, p.73, Ls.1-2.) When medical arrived, Trooper Jayne informed the ambulance 
driver that the law allows him to hold Mr. Wheeler down to perform the forcible blood 
Mr. Wheeler believes that Trooper Jayne's intention by driving with the ambulance to 
the rock quarry was to conduct a forcible blood draw regardless if Mr. Wheeler was 
going to submit to a breath test. 
draw because of the nature of this case. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:50:38.) Trooper Jayne 
then obtained hobbles out of the trunk of his car in anticipation of Mr. Wheeler physically 
refusing the blood draw. (Exhibit, ISP Video18:51:43.) Trooper Jayne falsely testified 
under oath that he offered Mr. Wheeler the choice of either submitting to a breath test or 
having his blood drawn. (Tr.07125107, p.12, Ls.9-11.) 
Trooper Jayne indicated that the ambulance driver was a phlebotomist. (Tr.Vol. 
2, p.304, Ls.6-7.) There was no proof, other than Trooper Jayne hearsay testimony at 
the suppression hearing, that the ambulance driver who withdrew Mr. Wheeler's blood 
was trained in the procedure of withdrawing blood. (Tr.0712512007, p.13, Ls.13-20.) 
Trooper Jayne removed Mr. Wheeler's handcuffs so they could have access to 
his arms. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.3-4.) Trooper Jayne had Mr. Wheeler remove his coat. 
(Tr.Vol. I ,  p.73, Ls.4-6.) Trooper Jayne held Mr. Wheeler's right arm from the 
passenger's side of the patrol vehicle, while Lieutenant Drake held Mr. Wheeler's left 
arm down from the driver's side of the car. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.6-9.) 
Ambulance personnel conducted the forcible blood draw. (Tr.Vol. 1, p.73, Ls.10- 
12.) Mr. Wheeler told the officers and the ambulance driver that they did not have his 
permission to withdraw his blood; they did not have his consent. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.304, 
Ls.15-16.) Mr. Wheeler told them "No." (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55:14.) Mr. Wheeler told 
them not to remove his blood. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55.) He told them "Don't draw 
blood" several times. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55:30.) Mr. Wheeler yelled "ouch and told 
them several more times to not draw his blood. (Exhibit, ISP Video 18:55.) Trooper 
Jayne lied to Mr. Wheeler telling him that they were giving him a shot to calm him down. 
(Exhibit, ISP Video 18:56:21.) Mr. Wheeler claimed that the forcible blood draw hurt 
and he told the ambulance driver not to poke him anymore. (Exhibit, ISP Video 1850.) 
Mr. Wheeler repeated saying "darn, darn darn" as a sign of releasing agony over being 
poked with a needle. (Exhibit, ISP Video 1858.) Mr. Wheeler would flex his hand in an 
attempt to prevent the blood draw. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.310, Ls.10-I?.) This made it difficult 
for the ambulance driver to hit Mr. Wheeler's vein. (Tr.Vol. 2, p.310, Ls.11-12.) 
Mr. Wheeler was poked several times with different needles in an attempt to obtain his 
blood. (Exhibit, ISP video.) Mr. Wheeler informed Trooper Jayne that he was hurting 
his leg restraining him during the blood draw. (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:04.) 
Mr. Wheeler was leaking blood all over the place. (Exhibit, ISP Video 19:06:13.) 
Mr. Wheeler asks this Court to hold that Trooper Jayne's conduct was 
unreasonable. The blood test violated Mr. Wheeler's constitutional rights to be free 
from unreasonable search and seizure. 
C. Mr. Wheeler Revoked His Implied Consent To Submit To An Evidentiarv Test 
Trooper Jayne read Mr. Wheeler the implied consent warnings. (See Exhibit ISP 
Video.) The implied consent warnings were consistent with Idaho Code 18-8002. 
Under the statute, a person who refused an evidentiary test will have their license 
suspended. I.C. § 18-8002. The Legislature has defined what penalty would be 
imposed for refusal. I.C. § 18-8002. 
Mr. Wheeler was explicitly informed that if he refused to submit to the evidentiary 
testing he would be subject to a civil penalty. (See Video, 18:44:10-18:45:08.) 
Mr. Wheeler was unequivocally informed that he would lose his driver's license, if he 
refused to submit to the evidentiary testing. (See Video, 18:44:10-18:45:08.) 
Mr. Wheeler was not informed that he had no right to refuse the evidentiary testing and, 
in fact, he was told of the specific consequences, if he refused. (See Video, 18:44:10- 
18:45:08.) The implied consent warnings are consistent with the constitutional 
protections against unreasonable search and seizure. Without a warrant, a person may 
refuse; if one refuses the penalty is taking away a person's driver's license, not forcibly 
submitting a person to an evidentiary testing without a warrant. 
While the ldaho Supreme Court has previously held that, "there is no 
constitutional right to refuse" an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration, that holding 
was not based on any federal court authority. See State v. Turner, 94 ldaho 548, 552, 
494 P.2d 146, 150 (1972); State v. Woolery, 116 ldaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989). In 
fact, no federal court has ever squarely addressed whether a suspect retains the right to 
revoke his implied consent to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration, under the 
Fourth Amendment. 
However, federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have 
repeatedly held that although a suspect can consent to a search of his person or 
property, that suspect retains the right to revoke, withdraw, or delimit his consent at 
anytime. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 348 (1991) (holding that a suspect may 
"delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he consents," in the context of 
a vehicle search); United States v. McWeeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (gth Cir. 2006) (holding 
that, "a suspect is free . . . after initially giving consent, to delimit or withdraw his or her 
consent at anytime," in the context of a stop and risk); United States v. Sanders, 424 
F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn."); United 
States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 907 (3rd Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a suspect retains the 
right to revoke his consent, in the context of a luggage search); United States v. 
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Marshall, 348 F.3d 281 (1' Cir. 2003) (same, in the context of a home search); United 
States V. Bustillos-Munoz, 235 F.3d 505 (loih Cir. 2000) (same, in the context of a 
vehicle search); United States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188 (4'h Cir. 1993) (same, in the 
context of a luggage search). 
Mr. Wheeler asserts that, even if he impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for 
alcohol concentration by purchasing a driver's license and driving or being in actual 
control of a motor vehicle, he still retains the right to revoke his consent to search under 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, especially where the search 
involves Mr. Wheeler's "deeply rooted expectation of privacy" against unwanted 
intrusions into his body. Accordingly, Mr. Wheeler respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the district court's order denying his motion to suppress as the State failed to 
meet its burden to prove that the involuntary blood draw conducted on Mr. Wheeler fell 
within any valid exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Rodriguez, 156 
P.3d 771 (Utah 2007) (holding that the fact that percentage of alcohol in a person's 
blood stream rapidly diminishes after drinking stop does not alone constitute a per se 
exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement). 
D. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct In Allowinq Trooper Javne To Present 
False Testimony, Failed To Correct The False Testimony, And Thereafter Failed 
To Correct The District Court's Reliance On The False Testimony When Allowing 
The Admission Of The Forcible Blood Test Results 
Mr. Wheeler submits that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress the results of the forcible blood draw. Mr. Wheeler submits that he made the 
motion and identified the ISP video for the court. Trooper Jayne thereafter lied in his 
testimony and the prosecutor failed to correct any of the misstatements. The court 
thereafter relied on the lies in ruling on its decision to allow the admission of the test 
results. To avoid repetition, Mr. Wheeler incorporates herein as if fully argued Section I. 
The district court stated: 
Mr. Wheeler made it quite clear that he was not going to submit to a 
breath test, and so the trooper made a decision at that point to use a 
blood draw. And reasonable he gave Mr. Wheeler the opportunity, he 
advised Mr. Wheeler if you don't consent to the breath test, we're going to 
do a blood draw. Mr. Wheeler indicated he would rather not have a blood 
draw, he didn't want a needle used. And the Trooper gave him that 
chance of, well, you can always have the breath test. And Mr. Wheeler 
refused a breath test as well again, and so he decided to do the blood 
draw. 
(Tr.05/02/07, p.29, Ls.5-14.) The district courts findings are contrary to the actual 
evidence and are based upon false testimony by Trooper Jayne, which went 
uncorrected by the prosecutor. (Exhibit, ISP Video.) 
Mr. Wheeler submits that the district court erred in finding the actions of the 
police officer reasonable in light of the fact that he lied. It would have been more 
reasonable and less objectionable to had Trooper Jayne actually attempted to obtain 
Mr. Wheeler's breath sample. Trooper Jayne manipulated the situation from beginning 
to end and this type of behavior should not be encouraged by this Court. Therefore, 
Mr. Wheeler requests that the order denying the suppression of the blood tests results 
be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wheeler respectfully requests that this Court vacate the Judgment of 
Conviction and reverse this case for a new trial. 
DATED this 1 5 ' ~  day of April, 2009. 
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